JURIES-UNANIMOUS JURY VERDICTS

No

LONGER REQUIRED FOR STATE

CONVICTIONs-Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972);
Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
FELONY

Frank Johnson was convicted of armed robbery in Louisiana by
a jury verdict of nine-to-three as provided for under Louisiana's Constitution.' He appealed to the Supreme Court of Louisiana,2 claiming
that the less than unanimous verdict had violated his due process
and equal protection rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.3
This argument was rejected 4 and the United States Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction. 5 His appeal in Johnson v. Louisiana6 was
founded on the contention that the dissenting jurors who voted for
acquittal showed that the state had not met its burden of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt, 7 and that he was denied equal protection by being
convicted without the unanimity which is requisite to convict individuals of less serious and capital crimes.8
In Oregon, where less than unanimous verdicts are also permitted
by the state constitution, 9 a jury found Robert Apodaca guilty of assault
1 LA. CONST. art. 7, § 41 provides in part:
All cases in which the punishment may not be at hard labor shall, until otherwise provided by law, be tried by the judge without a jury. Cases, in which the
punishment may be at hard labor, shall be tried by a jury of five, all of whom
must concur to render a verdict; cases, in which the punishment is necessarily
at hard labor, by a jury of twelve, nine of whom must concur to render a
verdict; cases in which the punishment may be capital, by a jury of twelve, all
of whom must concur to render a verdict.
2 State v. Johnson, 255 La. 314, 230 So. 2d 825 (1970).
3 Id. at 316, 230 So. 2d at 825.
4 Id. at 336, 230 So. 2d at 833. The court stated:
"These arguments do not impress us. We are entirely satisfied that the Constitution and laws of our state provide a system for this prosecution in which
fundamental fairness and even-handed justice can be and was dispensed."
Id. (quoting from State v. Schoonover, 252 La. 311, 323, 211 So. 2d 273, 277 (1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 931 (1969)).
5 400 U.S. 900 (1970).
6 406 U.S. 356 (1972).
7 Id. at 359.
8 Id. at 363. Louisiana requires unanimous verdicts in five-man jury trials where the
punishment may be at hard labor, and in twelve-man capital cases. Individuals charged
with a crime where the punishment is necessarily at hard labor may receive less than
unanimous twelve-man verdicts. Each "level" receives a distinct variation in procedure,
forming a "tri-level system." Id. at 368 (Powell, J., concurring).
9 ORE. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides in relevant part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial
by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed ... provided, however, that in the circuit court ten members of the jury
may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty
of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict, and
not otherwise ....
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with a deadly weapon by an eleven-to-one verdict. On review,' 0 the
Oregon Court of Appeals summarily dismissed his claim that he was entitled to have the jury instructed to find him guilty only by unanimous
concurrence as required by the Constitution of the United States. 1' The
Supreme Court granted certioraril 2 and, in Apodaca v. Oregon,5 heard
his contention that the conviction violated his sixth amendment right
to a trial by jury as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. 1 4 He
further argued that due process compelled an interpretation of "jury
trial" to include unanimity as a substantive component of reasonable
doubt, 15 and that denial of a unanimous verdict prevented him from
enjoying a true cross section of community opinion, as required by
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 16
The Supreme Court affirmed both convictions, upholding the
state constitutional provisions of Louisiana and Oregon which provide
for criminal felony convictions by less than unanimous jury verdicts. 17
Thus unanimity has been denied "constitutional stature""' as a fundamental right to be applied equally in the state and federal courts,
although a majority still favor unanimous verdicts in federal court
proceedings.' 9 The Court has also promulgated a substantial majority
10 State v. Apodaca, 1 Ore. App. 484, 462 P.2d 691 (1969).
11 Id. at 485, 462 P.2d at 692. See State v. Gann, 254 Ore. 549, 463 P.2d 570
(1969) (10-2 verdict provision in Oregon's Constitution does not infringe upon fourteenth amendment rights); State v. Osbourne, 153 Ore. 484, 57 P.2d 1083 (1936) (10-2
second degree murder conviction affirmed as court found no denial of equal protection
or due process). See also Note, Unanimity in Criminal Jury Verdicts: Antiquity or Necessity, 26 U. MIAMI L. REV. 277 (1971).
12 400 U.S. 901 (1970).
13 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
14 Id. at 406 (White, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Blackmun & Rehnquist, JJ., concurring).
15 Id. at 411.
16 Id. at 412-13.
17 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 365; Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 414 (White, J., concurring). Justice
White delivered the opinion of the Court in Johnson, 406 U.S. at 357, in which the Chief
Justice, Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell and Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice White also
delivered the judgment of the Court in Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 405, in an opinion in which
only the Chief Justice, Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist joined. Justice Powell
wrote a concurring opinion in Johnson, 406 U.S. at 366, in which he stated that he agreed
with Justice White's opinion in Johnson, but agreed only with the result reached in
Apodaca. Since Powell disagreed with White in Apodaca on a point which must be
regarded as dictum in that case-unanimity in federal courts-Justice White's opinion in
Apodaca will be referred to in the text of this note as the opinion of the Court.
18 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 406.
19 The minority of four justices would retain unanimous verdicts in both state and
federal courts. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion agreed with the minority in the
retention of federal unanimity, but voted with the majority in refusing to mandate such
state procedure. This created an artificial majority in favor of upholding unanimous
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rule, which should provide procedural guidance for future state crimi20
nal trials.
Although both cases represent state felony convictions in the
absence of jury unanimity, they may be distinguished on two points.
First, Johnson was convicted prior to the Court's ruling in Duncan v.
Louisiana2' that defendants in state criminal proceedings were entitled
to a trial by jury for all crimes which would fall within the sixth
amendment protection if tried in a federal court. 22 Since this decision

was found to be prospective in application, he was unable to raise a
sixth amendment issue, a handicap not shared by Apodaca by virtue
of his post-Duncan conviction. 23 Secondly, the Constitution of Louisiana
allows a nine-to-three jury verdict, while Oregon sets its standard of
concurrence at ten-to-two. In light of the majority's indication that
the Constitution requires conviction by a "substantial majority" of
24
the jury, this difference in ratio could have been significant.
At the outset, it should be noted that the history of unanimity
has been somewhat erratic. In early England it was once achieved by
removing the twelfth juror who would not agree, 25 by fining a dissenting juror,26 or by imprisoning the minority juror and giving the
verdict to the majority.27 It was believed to be sufficient if eleven were
verdicts as a federal requirement. 406 U.S. at 395 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J.,
dissenting). See also N.Y. Times, May 28, 1972, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 6.
20 This "rule" is rooted in the reliance which the Court puts on the verdict of a
substantial majority of the jury as fulfilling the due process requirement. A state which
contemplates dropping its unanimity requirement would be guided by the knowledge
that the Court found necessary a heavy majority, and would probably be reluctant to
approve at this time a bare majority rule. The Court saw no constitutional violations
because the verdict was rendered by "so large a majority of the jury" (Johnson, 406 U.S.
at 361), and referred often to the "substantial" and "heavy" majority of the jury. Id. at
362. Justice Blackmun concurred, but "[did] not hesitate to say, either, that a system
employing a 7-5 standard, rather than a 9-3 or 75% minimum, would afford me great
difficulty." Id. at 366.
21 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
22 Id. at 149.
23 Johnson conceded this point because of the Court's decision in DeStefano v.
Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 (1968), where it was held that the right to a trial by jury in
state courts for serious crimes was not retroactive. 406 U.S. at 358.
24 See discussion note 20 supra.
25 Thayer, The Jury and its Development, 5 HARV. L. REv. 295, 297 (1892). A sophisticated variation of this ancient method is the removal of the whole jury when agreement
cannot be reached and the initiation of a new trial with an eye towards unanimity. See
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824) (precedent of allowing retrial established where first trial ends with defendant neither convicted nor acquitted).
26 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 626 (2d ed. 1898).
27 Thayer, supra note 25, at 297. Cf. Mead v. City of Richland Center, 237 Wis. 537,
297 N.W. 419 (1941) (error to instruct jury that if they did not agree quickly they would
suffer from cold because heat in building was being turned off). But cf. Pope & Jacobs
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in agreement, the single dissenter being of no consequence.2 8 Not until
the middle of the fourteenth century was unanimity deemed to be an
established rule.2 9 Despite this apparent early acceptance, majority
verdicts were permitted in the American colonies of the Carolinas,
Connecticut and Pennsylvania," and the Bill of Rights was passed
without the specific provision for unanimity which had appeared in
32
an earlier draft, 3 1 leaving "such specification to the future."
In federal criminal proceedings, the concept of unanimity has
been faithfully supported in decisions which call it a "constitutional

' '35
right," 33 "required, ' 34 and an "inescapable element of due process.

v. State, 36 Miss. 121 (1858) (no error where bailiff "joked" to jury that until they decided
they would have nothing to eat or drink).
28 In Thayer, supra note 25, the author concluded: "[I]t was enough if eleven agreed;
the ground of this being the old rule that a single witness is nothing-testis unus testis
nullus." Id. at 296 (footnote omitted).
29 Id. at 297.
30 The Court in Apodaca described the historical development in America thusly:
Although unanimity had not been the invariable practice in 17th-century
America . .. explicit [state] constitutional provisions .. .indicate that unanimity
became the accepted rule during the 18th century, as Americans became more
familiar with the details of English common law and adopted those details in
their own colonial legal systems.
406 U.S. at 408 n.3 (emphasis added).
31 Id. at 409. James Madison proposed that the sixth amendment provide for trial
"by an impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite of
unanimity for conviction, of the right of challenge, and other accustomed
requisites .... "
Id. (quoting from 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789) [1789-1791]).
32 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410. The Court stated in its analysis of the history of
unanimity as it was intended to be incorporated into the Constitution that
[s]urely one fact that is absolutely clear from this history is that .. .the Framers
explicitly rejected the proposal [of unanimous verdicts] and instead left such
specification to the future.
Id.
33 See Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), where the Court reversed a unanimous
eight-man state conviction for a felony that was committed while Utah was still a territory
but under full constitutional protection, holding that
it was his constitutional right to demand that his liberty should not be taken
from him except by the joint action of the court and the unanimous verdict of a
jury of twelve persons.
Id. at 351.
34 Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948). The Court held that it was reversible error to allow a murder conviction in federal court on jury instructions which omit
the requirement of unanimity in determining the punishment. Id. at 748-49.
35 Hibdon v. United States, 204 F.2d 834, 838 (6th Cir. 1953). A felony conviction was
reversed because the defendant had waived the requirement of unanimity. The court held
that the right to a unanimous jury verdict may not be waived because
[i]t is the inescapable element of due process that has come down to us from
earliest time. No federal case has been cited and none can be found . . . that
holds or even remotely suggests that it may be waived.
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But such conclusions were based on a belief that the sixth amendment
meaning of "trial by jury" was fixed according to the common law at
the time the Constitution was written, 36 rather than on a finding of
unanimity as a fundamental right.3 7 Limited by such an historical

interpretation, the Court has not had to justify the requirement of
38
unanimity as a right per se where the sixth amendment applies,
and has resisted extension of this common-law protection to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. This reluctance was reflected in
Maxwell v. Dow, 39 where the Court concluded that the states should
determine for themselves the necessity of unanimous verdicts. 40 Further,
42
41
in the recent cases of Duncan v. Louisiana and Williams v. Florida,
the Court noted that it was not considering the issue of unanimity in
43
state courts.
Johnson and Apodaca squarely presented the Supreme Court with
the issue of jury unanimity in state felony trials. 44 Perhaps the closest
36 In Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898), the Court stated its reliance on this
approach thusly:
It must consequently be taken that the word "jury" and the words "trial by
jury" were placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference to the
meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in this country and in England at
the time of the adoption of that instrument ....
Id. at 350. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), where the Court held that
trial by jury
means a trial by jury as understood and applied at common law, and includes all
the essential elements as they were recognized in this country and England when
the Constitution was adopted ....
Id. at 288.
37 See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 740 (1948), where the Court justified the
requirement of extending unanimity to both guilt and punishment not because it was
fundamental in nature but because it was consistent with the history "of the AngloAmerican jury system." Id. at 749.
38 406 U.S. at 370-71 (Powell, J., concurring).
39 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (state provision allowing for conviction by an eight-man jury
held to be no violation of due process).
40 Id. at 605. The Court stated:
[I]t is in entire conformity with the character of the Federal Government that
[states] should have the right to decide for themselves what shall be the
form and character of the procedure in such trials . . . and whether the verdict
must be unanimous or not.
Id. (dictum).
41 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
42 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (Court held six-man jury was not unconstitutional in a state
felony trial).
43 391 U.S. at 158 n.30; 399 U.S. at 100 n.46. In Williams the Court stated: "We
intimate no view whether or not the requirement of unanimity is an indispensable element
of the Sixth Amendment jury trial." Id. See also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 213 (1968)
(Fortas, J., concurring) (unanimity was not yet required of states and suggestion was made
that it may be found non-fundamental).
44 406 U.S. at 369 (Powell, J., concurring).
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case on point was that of Hawaii v. Mankichi,45 where the Court let
stand a manslaughter conviction returned by a nine-to-three jury
verdict in the annexed territory of Hawaii. 46 This case was distinguished
from other similar fact situations in which the full requirements of the
sixth amendment were instinctively enforced against territories of the
United States by a finding that Congress had not intended the full
incorporation of Hawaii into the United States. The Islands had only
been annexed at the time of the conviction and had not yet achieved
territorial status with full constitutional protections. 47 But in a 54
decision, 48 the Court went further and stated:

[W]e place our decision of this case upon the ground that the two
rights alleged to be violated in this case are not fundamental in
their nature, but concern merely a method of procedure which
sixty years of practice had shown to be suited to the conditions
of the islands, and well calculated to conserve the rights of their
citizens to their lives, their property and their well-being.49
It was this approach which was endorsed in the Johnson and Apodaca
decisions: the approval of a reasoned method of procedure which does
not deny a fundamental right.
In discussing Apodaca's sixth amendment claim that his right to
a trial by jury was denied by a less than unanimous verdict, the Court
first noted the lack of a clear expression in the Constitution or in the
intent of the Framers which would compel an interpretation of "jury"
to include unanimity as an inseparable element.5" Thus freed from
the written instrument, the task became one of fathoming the role of a
45 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
46 Id. at 198, 218. See also Fournier v. Gonzalez, 269 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1959), where
the court upheld a less than unanimous verdict of first degree murder in Puerto Rico
because it had not been incorporated into the United States and thus was free to modify
its jury system. Id. at 29.
47 190 U.S. at 209-11. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (full constitutional right to a jury trial not applied to an Island not fully incorporated into the
United States); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (refusal to extend full constitutional right to a jury trial to Philippine Islands which had not been incorporated into
the United States).
48 Two of the five majority Justices concurred, preferring to base their decision
solely on the distinction that Hawaii had not yet become a full territory and therefore
was not entitled to sixth amendment protection. 190 U.S. at 218-19.
49 Id. at 218 (emphasis added). The other right to which the Court referred was that
of grand jury indictment, as the defendant had been indicted on information only. Id.
at 198.
50 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 410. The Court stated that their
inability to divine "the intent of the Framers" when they eliminated references
to the "accustomed requisitions" requires that in determining what is meant by a
jury we must turn to other than purely historical considerations.
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jury in today's society to determine if a unanimous verdict is essential
to preserve the guarantee of a jury trial.51 Unanimity was examined not
as a separable and distinct right, but as a component of the concept of
trial by jury, and the majority chose to evaluate the unwritten ideal
of unanimity in terms of the real purpose of a jury determination. The
function of a jury decision as a barrier between the state and the
defendant was recognized, but the Court also concluded that unanimity
did not "contribute to the exercise of .. . [the jury's] commonsense

judgment."52
The four dissenting Justices urged that acceptance of the Duncan
sixth amendment guarantee of a trial by jury necessarily included
conviction by a unanimous jury verdict.5 3 They were of the opinion
that the federal standard of unanimity is fully incorporated into the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 54 Indeed, the history
of the incorporation of the sixth amendment demonstrates a pattern of
applying the federal standard to the states on a point by point basis. 5
However, the scope of such absorption depends on the judicial outlook
of the majority. 56
51 Id.
52 Id.

53 Id. at 414-15 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Justice
Stewart's dissent was based on the historical precedent which had found unanimity to be
essential to the sixth amendment jury trial. Id. Justice Marshall further objected to the
"'functional'" technique which the majority used to "strip away, one by one, virtually
all the characteristic features of the jury as we know it." Id. at 400 (Marshall, J., joined
by Brennan, J., dissenting).
54 In his dissent, Justice Brennan noted the confusing result caused by the concurring opinion of Justice Powell, but concluded that
[i]n any event, the affirmance must not obscure that the majority of the Court
remains of the view that, as in the case of every specific of the Bill of Rights
that extends to the States, the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, however
it is to be construed, has identical application against both State and Federal
Governments.
Id. at 395-96 (footnote omitted).
65 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to trial by jury); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses);
Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (right to speedy trial); Parker v. Gladden,
385 U.S. 363 (1966) (right to impartial jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right
to confront witnesses); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to assistance of
counsel); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (right to a public trial). No single decision
incorporated the sixth amendment in toto to be applied to the states. Rather, such
absorption was done selectively. See generally Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the
Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963); O'Brien, Juries and Incorporation in 1971,
1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
56 See Ryan, Less Than Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 58 J. Qusm.
L.C. & P.S. 211 (1967), where the acceptance of non-unanimous verdicts is stated as being
dependent on who is sitting on the Court when the question arises: "The 'incorporation
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An awkward result was reached in Apodaca because there was an
implied sixth amendment requirement of unanimity for federal courts
while such protection was decidedly withheld from the states. In his
concurring opinion, Justice Powell viewed the federal standard as
being "in accord both with history and precedent," and found it must
be honored as a matter of comity to the past. 57 His decisive vote with
the majority rested on a belief that incorporation must not deprive the
states of their right to experiment with reasoned methods of procedure
which do not result in denials of fundamental liberties. 58 He chose to
establish the fundamental nature of each claimed right before demanding state acquiescence 59 to avoid enforcing common-law practices which
have questionable contemporary application.6 0
Traditionally, the essential function of a jury has been the interposition between the accused and the accuser of the unanimous
judgment of an impartial group of twelve citizens before life, liberty
school' will do battle with the 'fundamental principles of justice' school. Whichever school
has the most adherents will carry the day." Id. at 216 n.84.
Justice Douglas has been a consistent advocate of full incorporation, believing that
the fourteenth amendment's due process clause fully incorporated the first eight amendments. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345-47 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 516 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). This approach mirrors that of the late Justice
Black as expressed in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947), overruled by implication, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), wherein he asserted his opposition to the
majority holding that the fifth amendment provision regarding self-incrimination did not
apply to the states. In his dissent, Justice Black reasoned thusly:
My study of the historical events that culminated in the Fourteenth Amendment, and the expressions of those who sponsored and favored, as well as those
who opposed its submission and passage, persuades me that one of the chief
objects that the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately, and as
a whole, were intended to accomplish was to make the Bill of Rights, applicable
to the states.
332 U.S. at 71-72 (footnote omitted) (joined by Douglas, J.).
In Apodaca Justice Douglas "would construe the Sixth Amendment, when applicable
to the States, precisely as [he] would when applied to the Federal Government." 406 U.S.
at 388 (Douglas, J., joined by Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). Anything less would be,
in his opinion, a "'watered down'" version of fundamental guarantees. Id.
He also dissented "from this radical departure from American traditions" which
would permit less than unanimous convictions. Id. at 381. Yet his position should be
compared with that taken in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), which approved the
six-man jury, a marked departure from the historical reliance on twelve men. His acceptance of that interpretation was viewed not as a dilution of rights, but "as a necessary
consequence of our duty to re-examine prior decisions to reach the correct constitutional
meaning in each case." Id. at 107 (Black, J., joined by Douglas, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
57 406 U.S. at 371.
58 Id. at 377.
59 Id. at 373, 376.
60 Id. at 375-77.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:346

or property may be taken away. 61 The necessity of twelve men as an
62
indispensable element of a jury was found in Williams v. Florida'
to be "a historical accident." 63 Thus conviction by six men was not
a denial of the sixth amendment's guarantee of a trial by jury.
Noticeably absent from both the majority and concurring opinions of
Johnson and Apodaca is any mention of what specific number of factfinders constitutes an acceptable barrier.6 4 Insofar as the sixth amendment is concerned, the Court placed its emphasis on the mere existence
of a jury as satisfying the requirements of the amendment.6 5 Consequently, the function of a jury has been distilled to the singular right
of a defendant to have an independent judgment imposed between
66
himself and the state.
Johnson claimed that the dissenting jurors were proof of the state's
failure to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in violation of
his due process rights. 67 He relied on In re Winship,6s where the Court
held that the "Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'6 9 The Court
looked at the instant situation surrounding Johnson and concluded
that the nine jurors who were persuaded to vote for a conviction were
convinced on an individual basis by the evidence and by discussion
with the other members of the jury.70 Thus the Court viewed the reasonable doubt protection as dependent upon an individual rather than
a collective state of mind. 71 This approach underscores the importance of
61 See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (jury is a "safeguard" providing accused protection against the aberrant prosecutor or judge); Vanhorne v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 314 (1795) (jury is a "barrier" which "ought never to be
removed"). See generally Pope, The Jury, 39 TEXAS L. REv. 426 (1961); White, Origin
and Development of Trial by Jury, 29 TENN. L. REv. 8 (1961).
62 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
63 Id. at 102. The Court concluded that twelve men are not necessary to effect the
purpose of the jury system. Id.
64 Only Justice Blackmun in his concurring opinion mentioned the specific number
of 7-5 as giving him "difficulty," yet he did not go on to state what margin is acceptable.
406 U.S. at 366. See discussion note 20 supra.
65 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 411.
66 Id.

67 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 359.
68 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (juvenile charged with adult crime may be convicted only on
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, not by a mere preponderance of evidence).
69 Id. at 364.
70 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 361.
71 See Comment, Waiver of Jury Unanimity--Some Doubts about Reasonable Doubt,

21 U. Cmr. L. REv. 438 (1954), where a distinction is drawn between reasonable doubt
as an individual decision and unanimity (or verdict) as a group decision.
If any juror has a reasonable doubt, then the "group mind" has a reasonable
doubt, and the group should also vote a not guilty verdict. But the law is that
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jury deliberation as the means by which an individual juror reaches that
' 72
state of mind characterized as being "beyond a reasonable doubt.
With unanimous verdicts, the state's burden is one of persuading the
entire jury beyond a collective reasonable doubt. 73 One dissenting juror

would be evidence of the state's failure to convince the jury and a
conviction cannot be returned. A more realistic approach is taken by
the less than unanimous jury verdict because the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is on an individual basis, leaving to those
similarly-convinced jurors the responsibility of finding guilt or in4
nocence:
Johnson further claimed that his conviction under Louisiana's
three-tier system violated his equal protection rights.7 5 However, the
Court found that there was a rational basis for a sliding procedural
scale dependent upon the severity of the crime charged, and thus held
that selective use of less than unanimous jury verdicts by a state is
76
not violative of equal protection guarantees.
Apodaca's equal protection contention was that unanimity was
essential to preserve jury panels which reflect cross sections of the
community, equating meaningful participation with unanimity.7 7 He
argued that unless the state required unanimous verdicts, convictions
the jury is "hung" and a new trial is necessary. This inconsistency seems to indicate that the analogy is faulty . . . .Proof beyond a reasonable doubt should be
confined to the subjective standard applied by the individual juror, and
unanimity-a group concept-must be justified in some other terms.
Id. at 442 (footnotes omitted). See also Ryan, supra note 56, at 214.
72 In Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895), the Court described reasonable
doubt as being "of necessity the condition of mind produced by the proof resulting from
the evidence in the cause." Id. at 460. See also Hill v. Wabash Ry. Co., 1 F.2d 626, 631
(8th Cir. 1924) (court approved instruction to jury to individually decide with deference
to the majority opinion).
73 In his dissent, Justice Marshall noted the majority's reasoning that lack of
unanimity established a group reasonable doubt sufficient to compel a retrial but not
enough to result in acquittal, and that therefore three dissenting jurors were not evidence
of the state's failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 406 U.S. at 400-01. Justice
Marshall found this argument to be "a complete non sequitur:"
The reasonable-doubt rule, properly viewed, simply establishes that, as a prerequisite to obtaining a valid conviction, the prosecutor must overcome all of the
jury's reasonable doubts; it does not, of itself, determine what shall happen if
he fails to do so. That is a question to be answered with reference to a wholly
different constitutional provision, the Fifth Amendment ban on double jeopardy ....
Id. at 401.
74 See Comment, supra note 71, at 442.
75 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 363.
76 Id. at 364.
77 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 412-13. In his dissent Justice Brennan was troubled by the
possibility that "[w]hen less than unanimity is sufficient, consideration of minority views
may become nothing more than a matter of majority grace." Id. at 396.
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would "occur without the acquiescence of minority elements within the
community." 78 But the Court refused to extend the right of dissent
to every distinct minority group, construing equal protection in this
instance as being no more than the right not to have such groups
systematically excluded from jury panels. 79 The right of a defendant
to have a jury which is representative of the community has never
80
been viewed as one of requiring the "physical" presence of minorities.
Rather, it has been held in Witherspoon v. Illinois"' that the jury
"can do little more-and must do nothing less-than express the
conscience of the community. '82 Since this community cross section
can be adequately represented by a six-man jury, 2 a verdict rendered
by nine or ten jurors, from which two or three dissent, does not deny
a defendant the beriefit of adequate community participation. However, there is a possibility for denial of meaningful deliberation if the
required concurrence of jurors is reached before any discussion takes
place, thus allowing the return of a verdict absent even a cursory
84
examination of the facts.
78 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 413.
79 Id. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (state may not exclude
jurors on basis of race); Hansen v. United States, 393 F.2d 763 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 833 (1968) (jurors cannot be systematically excluded on basis of race, religion,
political, economic or social status).
80 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) (defendant not entitled to presence of
fellow minority citizens on jury, but such persons may not be systematically excluded);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880) (Negro defendant has no right to have jury composed of fellow Negroes, such mixture of jury is not essential).
The Court does, however, insist upon the physical presence of minority groups in
the panels from which the jury is drawn. See Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545 (1967)
(Court found prima facie case of Negro exclusion); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587
(1935) (prima facie case of exclusion compels inclusion). The same is true for grand
juries, which also directly affect a defendant's imperiled freedom. See Cassell v. Texas,
339 U.S. 282 (1950) (token Negro on grand jury for past 21 years established prima facie
case of exclusion).
The right to proportional representation does not extend to those areas which do not
directly affect a defendant, such as jury commissions. See Carter v. Jury Commission of
Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (absence of Negroes on jury commission does not compel
their inclusion).
81 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Court found that a defendant has a right to a jury
which reflects community opinion. The exclusion of potential jurors whose aversion to
the death penalty mirrored public opinion denied the defendant the benefit of their
conscience. The requirement that a jury be neutral demanded that reasoned public
sentiment not be systematically excluded. Id. at 518-23.
82 Id. at 519.

83 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). The Court reasoned:
[I]n practice the difference between the 12-man and the six-man jury in terms
of the cross-section of the community represented seems likely to be negligible.
Id. at 102.
84 406 U.S. at 396 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Tamm,
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In thus interpreting the sixth and fourteenth amendments, the Supreme Court placed a heavy emphasis on the individual juror. Justice
Stewart's dissent presented other protections which have been thrown
around the jury, such as change of venue, protection from exaggerated
press coverage, and restrictions on information the jury may receive during a trial, and suggested that unanimity was equally necessary. 5 The
majority did not confront these arguments, implying that while such
protections are necessary for the whole jury insofar as they protect
the collective mind of the jury from improperly oriented evidence,8 6
the individual juror will reach a state of certitude on the facts regardless of any limitation or imposition of unanimity.8 7 While the Court

recognized the importance of the individual juror, it was dissuaded
from giving such an individual the right to block a conviction with a
dissenting vote when a state legislature has provided for less than
8
unanimous jury verdicts.
The traditional acceptance of unanimity has been carefully criticized in recent years.8 9 The American Bar Association has issued
The Five-Man Civil Jury: A Proposed Constitutional Amendment, 51 GEo. L.J. 120 (1962),
where the author suggests:
Unanimity requires full and frank discussion in the jury room. It requires a
defense of each juror's individual viewpoint and a challenging inquiry to those of
opposing view. Minority conclusions, possibly founded on passions and prejudices, must yield in the forum of the jury room to the demand of a unanimous,
objective verdict.
Id. at 139. But see H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 496 (1966), where the
authors concluded that
the deliberation process although rich in human interest and color appears not to
be at the heart of jury decision-making. Rather, deliberation is the route by which
small group pressures produce consensus out of the initial majority.
Id.
85 406 U.S. at 398-99.
86 These "whole jury" protections insure that the evidence which the jury receives
and upon which it must render a verdict comes solely from the witness stand. See Bruton
v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (reversal due to improper introduction of co-defendant's confession because of "risk" that jury might be swayed, despite court instructions to
disregard such evidence); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (conviction obtained
in a community saturated with inflammatory press coverage overturned); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (1965) (murder conviction reversed where jury had constant association
with deputies who testified at trial because such contacts could color the credibility jurors
might place on the testimony); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (state conviction vacated
on ground of prejudicial publicity).
87 Johnson, 406 U.S. at 362. See Comment, supra note 71, at 443.
88 Apodaca, 406 U.S. at 413. See Haralson, Unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal
Cases, 21 Miss. L.J. 185, 193 (1950).
89 See Barnett, The Jury's Agreement-Ideal and Real, 20 ORE. L. REV. 189 (1941);
Haralson, supra note 88; Kun, Validity of the Unanimous Verdict Requirement, 58 DICK.
L. REV. 165 (1954); Weinstein, Trial by Jury and Unanimous Verdicts, 69 U.S.L. REV. 513
(1935); Winters, Majority Verdicts in the United States, 26 J. AM. JuD. Soc'Y 87 (1942).
For earlier criticism, see ALI CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 335 (June 1930 Draft)
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a tentative draft entitled Trial By Jury in which its Advisory Committee noted only one drawback, that of deadlock, which occurs in an
insignificant number of trials. 90 Yet they "concluded that the minimum
standards should recognize the propriety of less than unanimous
92
verdicts."91 England has abandoned its protection of unanimity,
although it requires that there be a minimum deliberation time by
the jury before a verdict may be returned.93 Finally, by upholding the
state constitutional provisions of Louisiana and Oregon allowing for
non-unanimous verdicts, the Supreme Court has added its criticism
of the concept of unanimity. It has been suggested that the reasons
for ending the requirement of unanimous jury verdicts would be to
eliminate obstinate or corrupt jurors, hung juries and their consequential economic and emotional burdens, and the "unreasonable';
expectation that twelve jurors can arrive at one opinion. 94 Others
attribute this trend to a growing "law and order" mood. 95 But these
(approval of 12-0, 10-2, and 8-4 verdicts dependent upon severity of crime charged);
Burdick, Criminal Justice in America, 11 A.B.A.J. 510 (1925); Lindsey, Unanimity of
Jury Verdicts, 5 VA. L. REG. 133 (1899) (civil cases); Linn, Changes in Trial by Jury, 3
TEMPLE L.Q. 3 (1928); Roberts, Trial Procedure-Past,Present and Future, 15 A.B.A.J.
667 (1929); Note, Unanimity of the Jury, 39 AM. L. REv. 108 (1905); Summary of Events,
The Juries Bill, 8 AM. L. REv. 175 (1873).
90 ABA, STANDARDs RELATNG TO TRIAL BY JURY 26 (Project on Minimum Standards
for Criminal Justice, Tentative Draft, 1968). The Advisory Committee noted two advantages to unanimous verdicts: 1. careful jury deliberation and continued debate until
unanimity is achieved, and 2. prima facie evidence of a fair trial. Id. (quoting from Holtzoff, Modern Trends in Trial by Jury, 16 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 27, 27-28 (1959)).
91 See ABA, supra note 90, at 28.
92 Criminal Justice Act 1967, c. 80 provides:
13. Majority verdicts of juries in criminal proceedings.-(l) Subject to the
following provisions of this section, the verdict of a jury in criminal proceedings
need not be unanimous if(a) in a case where there are not less than eleven jurors, ten of them agree on
the verdict; and
(b) in a case where there are ten jurors, nine of them agree on the verdict;
and a verdict authorised by this subsection is hereafter in this section referred to
as "a majority verdict".
See also Samuels, Criminal Justice Act, 31 MoD. L. REv. 16 (1968).
93 Criminal Justice Act 1967, c. 80 provides also:
(3) A court shall not accept a majority verdict unless it appears to the court
that the jury have had not less than two hours for deliberation or such longer
period as the court thinks reasonable having regard to the nature and complexity
of the case.
See also Practice Direction, [1967] 3 All E.R. 137 (C.A.) (directions given to judges to
insure uniform summing up before jury under the new procedure of non-unanimous
verdicts).
94 For discussion regarding the rationale for allowing less than unanimous jury verdicts
see TEx. CONST. ANN. art. 5, § 13 (Interpretive Commentary) and Comment, Should Jury
Verdicts Be Unanimous in Criminal Cases?, 47 ORE. L. REv. 417 (1968).
95 Justice Douglas in his dissent commented that the majority holdings in Johnson
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are essentially practical considerations which attempt to add a finite
dimension to a concept that is perhaps beyond rational measurement.
Advocates and critics of the unanimous jury verdict ideal possess
an almost religious conviction regarding its worth. While the Justices
in both the majority and dissenting opinions of Johnson and Apodaca
justify their respective beliefs, they fail to explain why the concept of
unanimity has endured for over 600 years. Was it "a historical accident" like the twelve-man jury requirement? Or did it serve the
function of insuring meaningful deliberation in those instances which
demanded a complete discussion of the facts? If the Court is to discard
its traditional adherence to unanimity, then it should substitute the
guarantee that a jury must deliberate before returning a verdict. A
defendant's right to a trial by jury is not wholly served in some
capricious numerical majority, but in the deliberated verdict of an
impartial jury. However, the Supreme Court may continue to place
added emphasis on the individual juror by interpreting the decisionmaking process which the individual undergoes while hearing proper
trial evidence to be sufficient reasoned judgment in lieu of actual
group deliberation. Whichever direction the Court pursues, the Johnson-Apodaca rationale insures that future inquiry into the fundamental requisites of jury verdicts will be unhindered by outdated
historical concepts.
Robert J. Hrebek
and Apodaca are the result of "a 'law and order' judicial mood." 406 U.S. at 393. See also
N.Y. Times, supra note 19.

